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Abstract
■ This study presents the first direct investigation of the
hypothesis that dopamine depletion of the dorsal striatum in
mild Parkinson disease leads to impaired stimulus–response
habit formation, thereby rendering behavior slow and effort-
ful. However, using an instrumental conflict task, we show that
patients are able to rely on direct stimulus–response associa-
tions when a goal-directed strategy causes response conflict, sug-
gesting that habit formation is not impaired. If anything our
results suggest a disease severity–dependent deficit in goal-
directed behavior. These results are discussed in the context
of Parkinson disease and the neurobiology of habitual and goal-
directed behavior. ■
INTRODUCTION
If an act became no easier after being done several
times, if the careful direction of consciousness were
necessary to its accomplishment on each occasion,
it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime
might be confined to one or two deeds (…). A
man might be occupied all day in dressing and
undressing himself (Maudsley, 1876, p. 155).
Since Maudsley (1876) wrote these words on the im-
portance of habit formation, it has been proposed by
many psychologists that instrumental behavior becomes
habitual with extensive practice (Bolles, 1972; Kimble &
Perlmutter, 1970; Tolman, 1932; James, 1890). The un-
derlying associative mechanism was first described by
Thorndike (1911) as a gradual stamping in of associations
between contextual stimuli (S) and responses (R) that lead
to rewarding outcomes (O). Via these direct S→R associa-
tions, instrumental actions can be activated with minimal
cognitive effort, thereby freeing up cognitive resources.
The ability to form habits allows for fast selection of appro-
priate responses in stable contexts and therefore plays a
crucial role in much of our everyday decision-making.
Although the notion of habit formation has been
around for a long time, a gradual shift from internal to ex-
ternal control over behavior with practice was not dem-
onstrated experimentally until the 1980s. Adams (1982)
showed that after extensive training, instrumental behavior
of rats loses its direct sensitivity to the incentive value of
the outcome, suggesting a transition from goal-directed
behavior mediated by O→R associations1 to S→R habits
directly driven by external cues (de Wit, Corlett, Aitken,
Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2009). This overtraining paradigm
was used only very recently to demonstrate that in humans,
as in animals, practice leads to the development of behav-
ioral autonomy (Tricomi, Balleine, & OʼDoherty, 2009).
Moreover, humans as well as other animals will revert to
a habitual strategy even early in training if a goal-directed
strategy causes response conflict (de Wit, Corlett, et al.,
2009; de Wit, Niry, Wariyar, Aitken, & Dickinson, 2007).
Recently, the neurobiology of these distinct habitual and
goal-directed control mechanisms has received an increas-
ing amount of attention (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Yin,
Knowlton, & Balleine, 2004; Joel & Weiner, 2000). Although
the BG has long been implicated in habit memory (Packard
& Knowlton, 2002; Mishkin, Malamut, & Bachevalier, 1984),
behavioral neuroscience studies with rodents have only re-
cently begun to elucidate the specific neural mechanisms
of experimentally defined behavioral control processes.
This work has shown that the dorsomedial striatum and
the prelimbic cortex subserve goal-directed actions (Yin,
Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005; Corbit & Balleine, 2003;
Killcross & Coutureau, 2003; Balleine & Dickinson, 1998),
whereas habit formation is reflected in a shift in control
toward the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) (Yin & Knowlton,
2006; Yin et al., 2004, 2005). Dopamine is thought to be
crucially involved in this process (Wise, 2004), and the
dopaminergic projection from the substantia nigra to the
dorsal striatum has been implicated in the reinforcement
of habits (Faure, Haberland, Conde, & El Massioui, 2005;
see also Reynolds, Hyland, & Wickens, 2001).
Homologue areas ( Joel & Weiner, 2000) are thought to
be involved in human instrumental behavior. Several fMRI
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studies implicate the ventromedial pFC (vmPFC; de Wit,
Corlett, et al., 2009; Tanaka, Balleine, & OʼDoherty, 2008;
Valentin, Dickinson, & OʼDoherty, 2007) and the anterior
caudate nucleus (OʼDoherty et al., 2004) in goal-directed
control. On the other hand, Tricomi et al. (2009) recently
provided the first evidence for progressive recruitment
of the human homologue area of the rodent DLS, namely,
the dorsal putamen, with prolonged instrumental training.
However, this evidence is merely correlational in that
Tricomi et al. observed increased fMRI activations in this
area as a function of practice. So far, there is no direct
evidence that in humans the dorsal striatum plays a critical
supporting role in S→R habit formation.
One approach to studying the importance of meso-
corticolimbic circuits and dopamine for habitual control
is by investigating the effects of Parkinson disease (PD).
PD is associated with progressive nigrostriatal and meso-
corticolimbic dopamine depletion and is accompanied
by subtle cognitive impairments even in the early stages,
resembling those seen in frontal lobe patients (Owen
et al., 1992, 1995; Taylor, Saint-Cyr, & Lang, 1986). Mild
PD is a particularly good model for assessing the hypoth-
esized distinct roles of different parts of the striatum be-
cause studies have shown that, in early PD, dopamine
depletion is most severe in the dorsal striatum, only later
progressing to areas associated with goal-directed action
control, including more ventral and medial parts of the
striatum and pFC (Agid et al., 1993; Kish, Shannak, &
Hornykiewicz, 1988). In keeping with this neurobiological
pattern of dopamine depletion, it has long been hypothe-
sized that, already at an early stage of the disease, PD is ac-
companied by a disruption of habit formation (Knowlton,
Mangels, & Squire, 1996), which would render even sim-
ple everyday activities or performing more than one action
at once effortful for these patients (Brown & Marsden,
1990, 1991). For instance, on the basis of evidence for
impaired implicit, incremental associative learning of rela-
tionships between stimuli and outcomes in a probabilistic
classification task but intact acquisition of declarative
knowledge, Knowlton et al. (1996) have argued that PD
patients exhibit a habit memory deficit (but see, Witt
et al., 2006). Since then, similar feedback-based (proba-
bilistic) learning impairments have been observed in a va-
riety of instrumental learning paradigms (Frank, Samanta,
Moustafa, & Sherman, 2007; Frank, Seeberger, & OʼReilly,
2004; Shohamy et al., 2004; Shohamy, Myers, Onlaor, &
Gluck, 2004). Accordingly, it is now well accepted that
mild PD can be accompanied by instrumental learning
impairments (but see Swainson et al., 2006). However, a
major problem with many of these instrumental learning
studies is that paradigms were used that cannot distin-
guish between the deployment of habitual versus goal-
directed associative structures in instrumental behavior
as defined experimentally in the animal literature.
The primary aim of the present study is to address this
confound between habit-based and goal-directed behav-
ior in the PD literature. To this end, we employed a be-
havioral procedure that has been used successfully in
previous studies to establish habits in both animals and
humans. Specifically, we assessed the concurrent learn-
ing of multiple biconditional instrumental discriminations
in which fruit pictures and points functioned both as dis-
criminative stimuli and as outcomes for left and right key-
presses (de Wit, Corlett, et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2007;
for animal studies with an equivalent task, see de Wit,
Ostlund, Balleine, & Dickinson, 2009; de Wit, Kosaki,
Balleine, & Dickinson, 2006; Dickinson & de Wit, 2003).
The three types of discriminations are illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 (for a more elaborate explanation, see Methods).
Whereas four different fruits functioned as stimuli and
as outcomes in the standard biconditional discrimination,
the other two discriminations each involved only two
fruit pictures that were either the same in each com-
ponent of the discrimination (congruent) or opposites
(incongruent). In the latter incongruent discrimination,
fruit pictures should become associated with opposite
responses via S→R versus O→R associations. Critically,
whereas performance on congruent and standard dis-
criminations can be supported by both goal-directed as-
sociative structures as well as stimulus–response (S-R)
habit formation, the incongruent discrimination requires
predominant reliance on S→R associations to prevent
response conflict due to O→R associations. In previous
studies, this reliance on the habit system was reflected in
overall poor performance on this incongruent discrimina-
tion relative to the congruent and standard discriminations
that receive additional support from the goal-directed sys-
tem (de Wit, Corlett, et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2007). To
assess directly the degree to which subjects adopted habit
or goal-directed learning strategies to solve the different
discriminations, we employed an “instructed” outcome
devaluation test at the end of training (for detailed de-
scription, see Methods). If subjects formed O→R asso-
ciations during training and were successful in using the
instructed value to guide their behavior during the test,
they should direct their actions toward the still-valuable
fruit outcomes at the expense of devalued goals. In line
with our theoretical account of incongruent performance,
previous studies have shown that outcome devaluation test
performance of young healthy volunteers is indeed im-
paired for the incongruent relative to the other discrimina-
tions (de Wit, Corlett, et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2007).2
To summarize, with this study we aimed to extend the
existing correlational evidence for the role of the striatum
in the ability to form habits in humans (Tricomi et al.,
2009) by assessing whether mild PD patients, character-
ized by relatively severe dopamine depletion in the DLS,
exhibit a significant S→R habit formation deficit. In keep-
ing with the above-reviewed literature, we predicted that
mild PD patients would exhibit disproportionate difficulty
with the learning of the incongruent discrimination, which
requires the use of S→R habits. Conversely, performance
on the subsequent outcome devaluation test should not
be negatively affected early in the disease as it relies on
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goal-directed associative structures, which should at that
stage be relatively intact. Importantly, we also investigated
whether there was a negative relationship between dis-
ease severity and outcome devaluation test performance
in our sample because of progressive dopaminergic deple-
tion of areas that support goal-directed action control.
Finally, to investigate the role of dopamine in the hypoth-
esized habit formation deficit, we compared performance
of groups of patients on versus off their normal regimen of
dopaminergic medication.
METHODS
This study was approved by the Peterborough and Fenland
Local Research Ethics Committee. All subjects gave written
consent.
Patients
Thirty PD patients were recruited from the Brain Repair
Centre at Addenbrookeʼs Hospital, Cambridge, UK. All pa-
tients were diagnosed by a neurologist, and all were re-
ceiving dopaminergic medication. Fifteen patients were
tested taking their medication as usual (On group; 11 men/
4 women), whereas the other half was asked to abstain
from their medication 18 hr before the test session (Off
group; 11 men/4 women). This procedure allowed us to
investigate the effect of medication withdrawal using a
between-subjects design (to prevent practice effects as-
sociated with a within-subject design). Average number
of hours since taking the last dose was approximately
4.5 hr for patients in the On group and approximately
20 hr for the Off group. We endeavored to match the pa-
tient groups in terms of the type of medication as much
as was feasible. As can be seen in Table 1, 23 of the 30 pa-
tients tested were receiving L-dopa. The remaining seven
patients all received the D3 (and to lesser extent D2/D4)
receptor agonist ropinirole. Demographics and clinical
characteristics of the PD patients are detailed in Table 2.
None of the patients had a significant neurological his-
tory unrelated to PD, and all patients were nondemented
(Mini-Mental State Examination [MMSE] > 24) and non-
depressed (Beck Depression Inventory [BDI] < 30, with
a range of 0–25 in the patients and 4–19 in the controls)
Table 1. Medications
PD On group PD Off group
D2/D3 receptor agonists 12 11
L-Dopa 10 13
Pergolide (D1/D2) 0 0
Amantadine 5 6
COMT inhibitor 0 3
Antidepressants 2 4
MAO-B inhibitor 0 3
Benzodiazepine 1 2
Figure 1. Grayscale
representation of an
example of the instrumental
contingencies for the
congruent, incongruent,
and standard discriminations
(left panel) and corresponding
goal-directed stimulus→
outcome→response (S→O→R)
associative structures (right
panel). The gray arrows
represent O→R associations
that cause conflict in the
incongruent discrimination.
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(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). The av-
erage disease duration was 6.2 years for the On group
(SEM = 0.7) and 8.5 years for the Off group (SEM =
1.4). None of the patients showed evidence for a dopa-
mine dysregulation syndrome. The severity of PD symp-
toms was assessed during the testing session with the
Hoehn and Yahr (1967) rating scale and the 44-item Uni-
fied Parkinson Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) (Fahn, Elton,
& Committee, 1987). Hoehn and Yahr ratings ranged be-
tween I and III. We expected higher UPDRS scores for the
Off group than for the On group. However, the two groups
did not differ significantly in terms of disease severity (as
reflected by their UPDRS scores), F < 1, suggesting that
had medication status been matched, disease severity was
likely more severe for the patients in the On group than
that in the Off group. Therefore, any effects of medication
might reflect effects of disease severity.
Controls
Fifteen healthy age- and IQ-matched control volunteers
were recruited through local advertisement in the Cam-
bridge community. The data of one subject had to be ex-
cluded because of a technical error, leaving 14 subjects in
the control (CS) group (9 men and 5 women). The back-
ground details of the control subjects are presented in
Table 2. Separate one-way ANOVAs established that there
were no significant differences between the On, Off, and
CS groups in terms of: age (F< 1); education (F< 1); and
premorbid IQ (as assessed with the National Adult Read-
ing Test [NART]; Nelson, 1982), with estimated verbal IQ
scores of 114, 119, and 120 for the On, Off, and CS groups,
respectively, F(2, 41) = 2.67, MSE = 64.89; MMSE, F(2,
41) = 1.77, MSE = 1.16; BDI (F < 1). BDI did differ con-
siderably between subjects, perhaps partly because posi-
tive scores can reflect the motor symptoms of PD rather
than true depression and could be expected to affect in-
strumental performance. However, we failed to find evi-
dence for correlations between the BDI score and the
discriminative performance during training and accuracy
of test performance (with Pearson correlations of −0.12
and −0.14).
Background Neuropsychological Tests
In addition to the instrumental conflict task, all volunteers
received several background neuropsychological tests:
letter and semantic fluency tasks (Benton, 1968), Stroop
(1935) task, pattern recognition memory (PRM), and spa-
tial recognition memory (SRM) (Sahakian et al., 1988). The
results are presented in Table 3. Separate one-way ANOVAs
showed that performance of the three groups on these
tasks was statistically indistinguishable: letter fluency, F <
1; semantic fluency, F< 1; Stroop (in terms of Stroop inter-
ference divided by Stroop words), F < 1; PRM, F(2, 41) =
1.30, MSE = 75.07; SRM, F(2, 41) = 1.28, MSE = 89.84.
Finally, in PD patients, disease severity in terms of UPDRS
score did not correlate with performance on these neuro-
psychological tests, letter fluency (r=−0.18), semantic flu-
ency (r = −0.18), Stroop (r = −0.22), PRM (r = −0.08),
SRM (r = 0.09), nor with age (r = 0.21), education (r =
0.05), NART (r = −0.29), MMSE (r = −0.16), and BDI
(r = 0.25).
Procedure
The full experiment took approximately 2 hr. The back-
ground and experimental tasks were always administered
Table 2. Background Details
Age Edu NART BDI MMSE UPDRS H&Y Hours Since Last Dose
On (n = 15) 64.8 (6.5) 12.4 (3.2) 33.6 (9.1) 7.7 (4.0) 28.9 (1.4) 36.7 (13.2) 1.7 (0.6) 4.3 (4.9)
Off (n = 15) 61.1 (2.1) 12.9 (2.7) 38.9 (9.0) 7.8 (6.9) 29.6 (0.8) 41.4 (18.9) 1.8 (0.8) 19.8 (2.8)
CS (n = 14) 63.0 (8.1) 13.1 (3.1) 40.0 (5.3) 6.3 (4.8) 29.3 (1.0) N/A N/A N/A
Values are presented as mean (SD).
Edu = education; NART = National Adult Reading Test; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination; UPDRS =
Unified Parkinson Disease Rating Scale; H&Y = Hoehn & Yahr; N/A = not applicable.
Table 3. Results of the Background Neuropsychological Tests
FAS Sem Flu Str Words Str Colors Str Interference PRM SRM
On (n = 15) 42.7 (13.8) 33.7 (6.2) 86.0 (15.7) 62.1 (12.3) 33.0 (10.4) 88.7 (10.2) 77.9 (12.8)
Off (n = 15) 43.7 (13.7) 31.8 (11.9) 93.0 (24.2) 64.5 (13.0) 32.6 (12.0) 92.5 (8.6) 80.6 (7.1)
CS (n = 14) 41.1 (15.4) 33.2 (6.2) 101.6 (17.6) 69.9 (14.9) 39.7 (12.5) 93.8 (6.7) 83.6 (7.2)
Values are presented as mean (SD).
FAS = letter fluency; Sem Flu = semantic fluency; Str = Stroop; PRM = pattern recognition memory; SRM = spatial recognition memory.
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in the following order: NART, FAS, MMSE, instrumental
conflict task, PRM and SRM, Stroop task, BDI, UPDRS,
and Hoehn and Yahr (1967) rating scale. The computer-
ized experimental task was adapted from the version
used by de Wit et al. (2007). The main changes were that
subjects received a demonstration of the task, as also in a
previous fMRI study with this paradigm (de Wit, Corlett,
et al., 2009; de Wit, Ostlund, et al., 2009), and that the
instrumental training phase was longer than that in pre-
vious studies to ensure that subjects acquired the instru-
mental discriminations.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of colored icons representing the
eight different fruits: orange, pineapple, pear, apple, ba-
nana, cherry, grape, and coconut (see also de Wit et al.,
2007). For the demonstration of the task, we used three
colored icons, representing beer, wine, and coffee. All
pictures were presented on a standard PC monitor, and
responses on a left (m) and right (z) key were recorded
on a standard keyboard using a program written in Visual
Basic 6.0.
Demonstration of Conflict Task and Instructions
All subjects received a demonstration of the conflict task,
using the following instructions on the computer screen:
In this game, you will get the chance to earn points
by collecting items from inside a box on the screen
by opening the box by pressing either the right or
the left key. If you press the correct key, the box will
open to reveal a drink inside and points will be
added to your total score. However, if you press
the incorrect key, the box will be empty and no
points will be added to your total. Your task is to
learn which is the correct key to press. Sometimes
it will be the left-hand key and sometimes the
right-hand key. The picture on the front of the door
should give you a clue about which is the correct
response. To give you an impression of the game
you will be asked to play later on, we will first give
you some demonstration trials. Just follow the
instructions on the screen.
Having read these instructions, subjects were shown a
picture of a closed box with a picture of a glass of beer on
the front door. At the bottom of the screen, we showed
them the instructions “Press Left.” Pressing the left key
led to a picture of an open empty box. On the following
screen, subjects were again shown a picture of a glass of
beer on the front door of a box, but this time with the
instruction “Press Right.” Pressing the right key was re-
warded with another glass of beer and 1 point. Subjects
were then shown in the same fashion that a cup of coffee
signaled that pressing the right key would not be re-
warded, whereas pressing the left key was rewarded with
a glass of wine and 1 point. Subjects were then given the
following instructions:
You have had a chance to learn which was the
correct key to press for two different pictures. In
the following demonstration, you will no longer be
told which response to make, and your task is to
press the correct key. Only the first keypress on
each trial will count and the quicker a correct
response is made the more points will be added to
your total, so try to respond as quickly as possible!
Subsequently, subjects received four practice trials
with the beer stimulus and four trials with the coffee stim-
ulus, randomly intermixed. Pressing the correct key for
the beer and the coffee was rewarded with points and
with either beer or a glass of wine inside the box, respec-
tively. Pressing the incorrect key was always followed by
an empty box. As in the real experiment, the faster a re-
sponse was made, the more points were earned. The
number of points awarded for correct responses within
the following RT ranges was as follows: 0–1 sec, 5; >1–
1.5 sec, 4; >1.5–2 sec, 3; >2–2.5 sec, 2; >2.5 sec, 1.
The outcome display showed a picture of the drink out-
come and the number of points earned. This display re-
mained present for 1 sec before being replaced by the
stimulus display of the next trial after a 1.5-sec intertrial
interval). The total score was always displayed at the top
of the screen. At the end of the discrimination training
phase, subjects received instructions for the (outcome-
cued) outcome devaluation test that was designed to as-
sess the strength of O→R associations:
In the next phase, two open boxes will appear on
the screen with different drinks inside them. One
drink was earned by a left response in the first
stage and the other by a right response. Although
both drinks were valuable previously, one of them
is now devalued and earns no points, whereas the
other is still valuable and gains points. The devalued
drink will have a cross on it. You should respond
by pressing the key that earns a valued drink. The
points you earn now will not be shown on the
screen but you will see your final total at the end
of the game. As in the training phase, only your
first response will count.
The subjects were then shown two open boxes on the
screen (one above the other), one containing a beer and
one containing a glass of wine. On the first trial, the wine
had a red cross superimposed on it, signifying that the left
response associated with it no longer earned any points,
whereas on the second trial the beer was shown with a
cross, signifying that the right response was no longer re-
warded. Each keypress marked the end of that trial and
was immediately followed by the next test trial. Subjects
therefore did not receive feedback about their perfor-
mance during the test to ensure that their choices were
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guided by O→R associations acquired during instrumental
training, but they were shown their total score at the end,
followed by the final instructions:
The actual game will be very similar to this.
However, it will be a lot harder, because you will
be asked to learn the correct responses to many
different fruit pictures. Try to collect as many
points as possible. You should pay attention to
the types of fruit that are found inside the boxes
following each response, because later on you will
be asked to gather some types of foods but not others.
Remember to respond quickly, as quicker correct
responses earn you more points. This is the end of
the demonstration. If anything in these instructions
is unclear, please ask the experimenter. If not,
youʼre ready to go! Please tell the experimenter
when you are ready to play the game. Good luck!
Discrimination Training
Once the experimenter had ensured that the instructions
and demonstration had been understood (and if neces-
sary, had rerun the demonstration until the instructions
were clear), each participant was presented with the first
trial. As with the demonstration phase, participants were
shown boxes bearing a fruit and were required to use this
information to select the left or right keypress. A correct
response led to another fruit picture and a gain of a min-
imum of 1 point and a maximum of 5, depending on RT.
Incorrect responses led to an empty box on the screen
and 0 points. Three discriminations were trained together:
cue-outcome incongruent, cue-outcome congruent, and
standard (see Figure 1). Two fruit icons were assigned to
the congruent discrimination, two to the incongruent dis-
crimination, and four to the standard discrimination.
Performing the correct response to a fruit stimulus
yielded the same fruit icon as the outcome in the con-
gruent discrimination but the other fruit icon in the in-
congruent discrimination. In the example of a congruent
discrimination in Figure 1, a banana signals that pressing
the left key will be rewarded with another banana, whereas
grapes signal that right keypresses will be rewarded with
grapes. In contrast, in the incongruent example, each
fruit functions as a stimulus and outcome for opposing
responses: An apple signals that pressing the left key will
be rewarded with a pineapple, whereas in the other com-
ponent of the discrimination, the pineapple signals that
pressing the opposite, right, key will be rewarded with
the apple. Finally, in the standard discrimination, two fruit
icons acted as the stimuli and the other two as the out-
comes with the assignment of stimulus–outcome pairs re-
maining constant across training. Hence, in the example,
the correct left response to a coconut stimulus consis-
tently yields a cherry outcome, whereas a correct right re-
sponse to the orange stimulus yields a pear outcome. As
can be seen in the right panel of Figure 1, performance
on the congruent and standard discriminations can be sup-
ported by an S→O→R associative structure. In contrast,
O→R associations can cause response conflict in the case
of the incongruent discrimination (for a detailed descrip-
tion and theoretical background, see de Wit, Corlett,
et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2007).
The icons were paired arbitrarily for the three discrimi-
nations, and the left response was correct for one icon
and the right response for the other icon of a pair. To
ensure that the identity of the icons was not confounded
with discrimination type, the assignments of these icon
and response pairings to the different discriminations
were permutated across participants, in such a way that
there were eight possible combinations, with each fruit
icon functioning overall twice as stimulus and twice as out-
come for each discrimination, once with a right and once
with a left response.
Discrimination training consisted of eight 12-trial blocks.
Within each block, there were two trials with each of the
component contingencies from each of the three discrim-
inations, which were presented in a random order that
varied across participants. Therefore, every participant re-
ceived a total of 16 trials with each component of the
three discriminations (twice as much as in the original ex-
periment of de Wit et al., 2007).
Outcome Devaluation Test
Following discrimination training, the participants were
reminded of the instructions for the outcome devalua-
tion test. This test consisted of four trials from each of
the three discriminations, two with one of the outcomes
devalued and two with the other outcome devalued.
These 12 trials were presented in a different random or-
der for each participant.
Questionnaires
Subjects were asked to indicate on a printed questionnaire
for each fruit that had functioned as a discriminative stim-
ulus, whether the right or the left response had been cor-
rect, andwhich fruit was presented inside the box following
a correct response for that discriminative stimulus.
Data Analysis
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS 15.0. We em-
ployed repeated measures ANOVA (RM-ANOVA), comple-
mented with two-tailed t tests, to investigate whether PD
patients and controls differed in accuracy (percentage
of correct responses per block of training) and RT (sec)
during discrimination training, in accuracy (average per-
centage of correct responses) during the outcome deval-
uation test, and in accuracy (number of correct answers
out of two per discrimination) on the questionnaires. In
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addition, we compared patients on versus off medication
on all of the abovementioned dependent measures. We
included each patientʼs sum UPDRS score as a covariate
in these RM-ANCOVAs because disease severity varied
considerably within our sample (with UPDRS scores rang-
ing from 19 to 82.5). All p values involving repeated mea-
sures factors are based on Greenhouse–Geisser sphericity
corrections, and all significant ( p < .05) first-order inter-
actions involving the factor of interest (discrimination
type) are reported.
RESULTS
Discrimination Training—Accuracy
To investigate the acquisition of instrumental discrimina-
tions, we conducted an RM-ANOVA on the percentage of
correct responses, with the between-subjects factor Group
(controls/PD patients) and within-subject factors Block
and Discrimination. As can be seen in Figure 2, the instru-
mental discriminations were acquired gradually, as sup-
ported by a significant effect of Block, F(7, 294) = 17.14,
MSE = 541.9, p < .0005. There was no Group × Block
interaction, F = 1.02, MSE = 552.2, but discriminative per-
formance was negatively affected overall in the PD patients
relative to the CS group, F(1, 42) = 3.99, MSE= 6311, p=
.05. We failed, however, to find evidence for a Group ×
Discrimination interaction, F(2, 84) = 1.70, MSE = 1479,
indicating that the congruence effect did not differ be-
tween PD patients and controls (see Table 4 for average
performance on the three discriminations). A main effect
of Discrimination, F(2, 42) = 11.01 , MSE = 872.1, p <
.0005, prompted pairwise comparisons. Congruent per-
formance was significantly better than both incongruent
and standard performance ( ps < .01), but, unlike in previ-
ous studies, the difference between standard and incon-
gruent performance was only marginally significant ( p =
.06). Importantly, two-tailed t tests on the percentage of
correct responses on the final block of training show that
both patients and controls performed significantly above
chance on all discriminations (PD, ts ≥ 2.60; CS, ts ≥ 6.01).
To investigate whether medication affected instrumen-
tal learning, we conducted a separate RM-ANCOVA on the
patients on/off medication. To take into account disease
severity, we included each patientʼs UPDRS score as a co-
variate. This analysis only yielded a significant effect of
Block, F(7, 189) = 2.96, MSE = 630.7, p < .05. There
was no main effect of Group (on/off ), F< 1, nor a Discrim-
ination × Group interaction, F(2, 54) = 1.23, MSE= 1006.
Finally, we failed to find an effect of the UPDRS covariate,
F < 1. In the present analysis, there was no significant ef-
fect of Discrimination, F < 1, but we do not wish to attri-
bute significance to this null effect in the patient group as
Figure 2. Average percentage
of correct responses (left
graph) and response RTs (sec;
right graph) across acquisition
of congruent, standard, and
incongruent discriminations
by Parkinson patients on/off
medication and the control
(CS) group.
Table 4. Average Percentage of Correct Responses during
Eight Blocks of Training on Congruent, Standard, and
Incongruent Discriminations + Outcome Devaluation Test
Performance + Questionnaire (Q) Scores for Naming the
Correct Response (R) and Outcome (O) by Parkinson Patients
On/Off Medication and Control (CS) Group
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 Test Q-R Q-O
PD On
Congruent 63 72 68 67 75 73 80 85 75 1.7 0.3
Standard 48 58 65 67 65 75 72 73 65 1.4 0.5
Incongruent 48 53 55 57 60 72 72 62 38 1.5 0.1
PD Off
Congruent 62 60 77 70 78 80 87 85 83 1.7 0.5
Standard 53 55 58 60 67 62 68 62 68 1.4 0.7
Incongruent 48 57 60 62 73 67 70 67 43 1.6 0.7
CS
Congruent 55 75 73 84 88 94 86 89 93 1.8 0.8
Standard 61 75 84 73 82 84 80 88 72 1.5 0.6
Incongruent 52 55 64 61 83 80 86 88 34 1.6 0.5
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we did not find evidence for a Group × Discrimination
effect in the prior analysis.
Discrimination Training—Reaction Time
Fast responding was encouraged during discrimination
training. In an RM-ANOVA of the RTs (sec) of PD patients
versus controls, we only found a significant effect of Block,
F(7, 294) = 44.94, MSE = 0.15, p < .0005, reflecting that
subjects gradually learned to respond faster, as is depicted
in the right panel of Figure 2. PD patients and control
subjects responded equally fast overall, F(1, 42) = 1.62,
MSE = 6.47, and there were no differences in RT depend-
ing on discrimination type, F= 1.03,MSE= 0.237. We also
conducted a separate RM-ANCOVA on the patient data to
investigate whether RT was affected by medication status
and disease severity. There were no significant main ef-
fects of medication status, nor of disease severity, Fs <
1, nor any first-order interactions.
Outcome Devaluation Test
As can be seen in Table 4, performancewas best on the con-
gruent test trials and worst on the incongruent trials. This
was confirmed with an RM-ANOVA with the between-
subjects factor group (PD/CS) and the within-subject fac-
tor discrimination. A significant effect of Discrimination,
F(2, 84) = 30.89, MSE = 787.6, p < .0005, was further in-
vestigated with pairwise comparisons, which showed that
congruent performance was significantly superior to stan-
dard performance, which in turn was better than incon-
gruent performance ( ps < 0.05). Separate t tests for the
PD/CS groups showed that performance was above chance
level only for the congruent and standard discriminations
( ps < 0.05). Therefore, we replicated the congruence
effect during test observed in previous studies (de Wit,
Corlett, et al., 2009; deWit et al., 2007). We failed, however,
to find an effect of group on the acquisition/deployment
of goal-directed R-O knowledge. The patients and controls
did not differ in their level of performance overall, F <
1, nor did discrimination interact with group, F = 1.02,
MSE = 803.2.
Again, we conducted a separate RM-ANCOVA on test
performance of the PD patients, with medication status
as a between-subjects variable and UPDRS score as a co-
variate. In line with our hypothesis, a significant main ef-
fect of UPDRS, p < .05, indicated that disease severity
negatively affected test performance. A two-tailed Pearson
correlational analysis on the average test performance and
UPDRS score yielded a significant negative correlation
(r = −.37, p < .05), as shown in Figure 3. We also found
that patients on medication tended to perform worse over-
all than patients off medication, but the effect of medica-
tion failed to reach significance, F(1, 27) = 3.38, MSE =
519.1, p = .08. Given that the medicated patients were
likely to be clinically more severely affected, this apparent
effect of medication might reflect an effect of disease se-
verity, in line with the effect of UPDRS reported above.
Outcome Devaluation Test—Reaction Time
An RM-ANOVA with the between-subjects factor group
(PD/CS) and the within-subject factor discrimination estab-
lished that RTs during test did not differ between the three
discriminations, F(2, 84) = 1.13, MSE = 1.393, with aver-
age RTs of 2.5 sec on both congruent and standard trials
and 2.8 sec on incongruent trials. RTs of patients and con-
trols were also statistically indistinguishable, F < 1, with
average RTs of 2.8, 2.5, and 2.5 sec for the On, Off, and
CS groups, respectively. The separate RM-ANCOVA on the
PD patients showed that RT also did not depend on medi-
cation status, F < 1, and did not correlate with disease se-
verity, F(1, 27) = 1.61, MSE = 10.06.
Questionnaires
Participants were asked to indicate the correct response
and outcome for both discriminative stimuli of each dis-
crimination and were given a point for each correct answer.
The scores for response and outcome for each discrimina-
tion ranged therefore from a minimum of 0 to a maximum
score of 2. These scores (see Table 4) were analyzed sepa-
rately. One subject in the control group failed to fill out the
questionnaire, leaving 13 subjects in that group.
As can be seen in Table 4, therewas a high level of explicit
S-R knowledge in all three groups, with average scores
of 1.5, 1.6, and 1.6 for the On, Off, and CS groups, respec-
tively. An RM-ANOVA comparing scores of PD patients and
controls did not yield any significant effects. Explicit knowl-
edge of the S-R relationships was the same for the differ-
ent discriminations, F(2, 82) = 1.65, MSE = 0.39, and did
Figure 3. Plotted is the negative correlation between the average
percentage of correct responses on the outcome devaluation test and
the UPDRS score of patients on medication (empty circles) and off
medication (filled circles).
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not differ between the two groups, F < 1. An additional
RM-ANCOVA on the performance of the PD patients also
failed to yield significant effects. There was no effect of
medication status, F<1, nor of discrimination, F<1. There
was also no evidence for a correlation between disease se-
verity and S-R memory, F(1, 27) = 1.57, MSE = 0.661.
Explicit memory of the instrumental outcomes in each
component was uniformly poor, as can be see in Table 4,
with average scores of 0.3, 0.6, and 0.6 for the On, Off,
and CS groups, respectively. An RM-ANOVA comparing
patients and controls showed that the level of knowledge
did not differ between these two groups, F < 1, nor be-
tween discriminations, F(2, 82) = 1.33, MSE = 0.35. The
RM-ANCOVA on the performance of the patients on versus
off medication also did not yield any significant effects.
Medication status did not affect explicit knowledge of
the outcomes, F(1, 27) = 2.78, MSE = 0.71, nor did dis-
ease severity, F < 1.
In summary, we report the following findings:
• PD patients show a general deficit in the acquisition of
instrumental discriminations.
• PD patients and controls perform better on the con-
gruent than on the standard and the incongruent dis-
crimination (whereas performance on the standard
discrimination is only marginally significantly better
than on the incongruent).
• PD patients are able to solve the incongruent discrim-
ination, which is thought to rely on direct S→R associa-
tions. In support of the latter assumption, patients and
controls do not perform above chance level on incon-
gruent trials of the outcome devaluation test.
• Disease severity correlates negatively with performance
on the outcome devaluation test.
• Explicit memory of the instrumental S:R→O contin-
gencies is not affected in PD patients.
DISCUSSION
This study presents the first direct investigation of a per-
vasive hypothesis about BG function, according to which
early PD is associated with dopaminergic depletion of the
dorsal striatum, resulting in impaired S→R habit forma-
tion as conceptualized and studied in animal research
(e.g., Dickinson, 1985; Thorndike, 1911). This habit ac-
count could explain some of the everyday problems that
PD patients encounter because behavior may indeed be-
come effortful and be slowed down considerably if one
always has to evaluate the outcome of each and every ac-
tion before undertaking it. A habit deficit has previously
been inferred on the basis of impaired performance of
PD patients on, for example, the weather prediction task.
However, the habitual status of performance on that task
has never been assessed by direct sensitivity to current
outcome value. Consequently, we do not know whether
performance is in fact behaviorally autonomous. In the
present study, we tested the habit hypothesis more directly
by using an instrumental conflict task (de Wit, Corlett,
et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2007). Disrupted habit forma-
tion should have been expressed in an inability to solve
the incongruent discrimination, which according to as-
sociative theory should rely predominantly on the forma-
tion of S→R habits. However, we found that PD patients
solved the incongruent discrimination above chance by the
end of training, suggesting that they adequately acquired
habits.
At the same time we did find evidence for a general im-
pairment during the feedback-based learning phase across
discriminations in PD patients compared with controls. We
therefore replicated earlier observations of a feedback-
based learning deficit (Shohamy, Myers, Kalanithi, & Gluck,
2008). This learning deficit may well be due to impaired
S→R formation, and this would certainly be consistent with
an earlier demonstration that the dorsal striatum is en-
gaged across discriminations during the acquisition phase
of this task (de Wit, Corlett, et al., 2009). However, goal-
directed support may similarly rely on the gradual building
up of associations, and impaired goal-directed control may
therefore also contribute to the present learning deficit. In
line with the latter possibility, we found evidence for a dis-
ease severity–dependent impairment of performance on
the subsequent outcome devaluation test. Performance
on this test should not be negatively affected by impaired
habit formation as it is mediated by goal-directed knowl-
edge, so this result suggests that progressive PD leads to
impaired goal-directed control. In the remainder of this
article, we will discuss the implications of as well as poten-
tial issues with the presented evidence.
Our evidence for disrupted goal-directed control is con-
sistent with other lines of evidence suggesting that pro-
gressive PD leads to a cognitive profile characteristic of
more ventral corticostriatal circuits (Agid et al., 1993; Kish
et al., 1988). In a previous fMRI study with the conflict
task, we showed that the vmPFC was engaged during per-
formance on the outcome devaluation test (deWit, Corlett,
et al., 2009). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that
activations in ventral corticostriatal circuits are modulated
by contingency, with vmPFC tracking local changes in cor-
relations between action and outcome rates (Tanaka et al.,
2008). Therefore, pFC and anterior caudate nucleus may
work together to support goal-directed learning. Interest-
ingly, a goal-directed deficit may concur with a separate lit-
erature that highlights a shift from internal to external
control in PD (van Spaendonck, Berger, Horstink, Borm,
& Cools, 1995; Brown & Marsden, 1988; Cools, van den
Bercken, Horstink, van Spaendonck, & Berger, 1984). Ob-
servations that PD patients have no problem initiating
actions when presented with an unambiguous external
stimulus (e.g., Rahman, Griffin, Quinn, & Jahanshahi, 2008;
Praamstra, Stegeman, Cools, & Horstink, 1998) suggest that
if anything remains intact in PD, it is the ability to act on
direct S→R associations. Difficulties with the internal gen-
eration of actions and cognitive plans as well as enhanced
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cue-reliance and stimulus-driven behavior are more in line
with a goal-directed impairment.
On the basis of work by, for example, Frank et al.
(2004, 2007), showing that instrumental learning is dopa-
mine dependent, we would expect a goal-directed deficit
during learning and test to be remediated by dopaminer-
gic medication. However, in the present study, we did
not find evidence for superior goal-directed action in pa-
tients on medication. In fact, performance of the On
group was marginally worse than that of the Off group.
It is important to point out that a caveat of this study is
that the On and Off groups were not matched well in
terms of disease severity, with patients on medication be-
ing clinically more strongly affected. The absence of an ef-
fect of medication status should be replicated in future
studies with more carefully matched patient groups.
One might argue that the instrumental conflict task is
not sufficiently sensitive to detect habit formation deficits
in PD. However, our results strongly suggest that incon-
gruent performance relies on habit formation. When sub-
jects were asked to select responses on the basis of the
instructed value of the instrumental outcomes, they were
able to do this only on congruent and standard trials. In con-
trast, performance on incongruent trials of the outcome
devaluation test did not differ from chance level (see also
de Wit, Corlett, et al., 2009; de Wit et al., 2007), indicating
a lack of goal-directed control over incongruent perfor-
mance. Further support for this possibility comes from
the recent fMRI study with the conflict task, which showed
not only that vmPFC is recruited during the outcome deval-
uation test but also that this area is preferentially engaged
during congruent and standard training relative to incon-
gruent (de Wit, Corlett, et al., 2009; de Wit, Ostlund, et al.,
2009). We argue that in the absence of goal-directed con-
trol over incongruent performance, response selection
was guided by direct S→R associations (see also de Wit,
Corlett, et al., 2009; de Wit, Ostlund, et al., 2009; de Wit
et al., 2007). Thus, the intact acquisition of the incongruent
discrimination by PD patients suggests that the ability to
form habits in the presence of conflicting O→R associations
is not affected.
It could still be argued that a relative S→R habit deficit
in PD patients was masked by their reliance on a more de-
clarative rule formation strategy to solve the incongruent
discrimination. Moody, Bookheimer, Vanek, and Knowlton
(2004) showed that mild PD patients are able to perform
normally on a probabilistic task, but at the same time
these patients showed activations in temporal brain areas
rather than the striatal areas that were activated in the
control participants, raising the possibility that the PD pa-
tients adopted an alternative, more declarative strategy. Al-
though we have so far not directly investigated the
possibility of propositional encoding of the incongruent
discrimination, we cannot exclude the possibility that this
represents an alternative viable approach to the instru-
mental conflict task. However, our current study provides
two lines of evidence against this possibility. First of all, PD
patients performed at chance level during the incongruent
trials of the outcome devaluation test. Successful encoding
of the incongruent rule should have allowed them to se-
lect the appropriate response for each valuable outcome.
Second, a questionnaire at the end of training failed to
produce evidence for superior declarative knowledge of
the instrumental contingencies in PD patients relative to
controls.
However, it remains possible that conflict-induced habit
formation relies on processes that are different from those
underlying habit formation in the context of extensive
training, and our data, therefore, do not exclude the pos-
sibility that PD is accompanied by deficits in training-
induced habit formation. Nevertheless, we should stress
that according to dual-system accounts of instrumental ac-
tion, S→R associations are strengthened even in the early
stages of acquisition, and indeed Tricomi et al. (2009)
showed that the dorsal putamen was engaged from the
outset of instrumental training. Of course goal-directed as-
sociations should usually dominate behavior control early
on, but conflict due to R-O associations can cause a reli-
ance on S→R associations from the outset (de Wit, Corlett,
et al., 2009; de Wit, Ostlund, et al., 2009; de Wit et al.,
2007). The possibility that the formation of strong S→R
associations with extensive practice is affected in PD dis-
ease could be investigated directly with the kind of para-
digm recently employed by Tricomi et al. If S→R habit
formation through extensive practice is impaired in PD pa-
tients, they should paradoxically outperform control sub-
jects on a subsequent outcome devaluation test.
Finally, it seems important to note that although it is of-
ten assumed that the dorsal striatum is crucially involved
in S→R habit formation in humans, direct evidence is so
far not overwhelming. Human studies have shown that this
area is involved in procedural learning, but caution is war-
ranted in equating this with the acquisition of S→R habits
as it has been studied in the animal studies that implicate
the dorsal striatum. An exception is the recent study of
Tricomi et al. (2009), which produced correlational evi-
dence for a role of this area in habit learning. Moreover,
in the present study, we addressed for the first time the
question whether intact functioning of the human dorsal
striatum is a prerequisite for S→R habit formation. Al-
though we failed to produce favorable evidence, this ques-
tion clearly deserves further scrutiny in human studies
employing experimental tasks that are analogous to the
carefully constructed paradigms used in animal studies.
In summary, we investigated in PD patients and age-
matched controls the ability to form habits by assessing
trial-and-error learning of S-R mappings using an instru-
mental discrimination task but failed to find evidence
for a relative impairment in the formation of S→R associ-
ations in PD patients. In fact, impaired performance with
progressive disease severity on a subsequent outcome
devaluation test suggests there may be a deficit in goal-
directed control. This goal-directed deficit may be due to
progressive depletion of ventral corticostriatal circuits.
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Therefore, our research does not lend support for the hy-
pothesis that habit formation is disrupted in mild PD pa-
tients and consequently highlights the need for caution
in accepting the habit account of effortful action in PD.
The present findings represent an important initial step
toward understanding the effects of PD on goal-directed
versus habitual behavior and will hopefully inspire further
investigations of instrumental dysfunction in PD with
behavioral models that capture this crucial distinction.
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Notes
1. Competing associative accounts of goal-directed action stress
the importance of either the forward R→O association or the
backward O→R association (for a review, see deWit & Dickinson,
2009). As our research does not aim to distinguish between these
accounts, we will for simplicityʼs sake refer to O→R associations.
2. It could be argued that the ultimate goal in the conflict task
was to earn points (rather than the more specific fruit picture
outcomes) and that subjects could rely on response-“correct”
outcome learning to the same degree in all discrimination learning
conditions. However, such a general goal should not allow for the
activation of appropriate goal-directed actions via S→O→R
associations as the general outcome (of points) should become
associated both with right and left responses (we refer the
interested reader to the “differential outcomes” literature; see,
e.g., Urcuioli, 2005). Furthermore, the outcome devaluation effect
provides evidence for reduced reliance on the fruit picture out-
come in the incongruent condition.
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